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Regulating Marriage in a New Environment
Carmen Garcimartin
ABSTRACT
The definition of marriage in a number of Western juridical systems
has been deprived ofsome of its constitutive elements. This new idea of mar-
riage, that includes different kinds of unions with diverse aims, appears to
enjoy the support of the majority of the population. Recent rulings of the Su-
preme Courts of Spain, the United States, and other countries confirmed the
general acceptance of this new shape of the marital union. The scenario of
the debate of marriage has deeply changed in a short time; now, those who
defend marriage with all its essential features are regarded as outlaws or
even bigots. These developments have led the regulation of marriage to a
crossroads, where we may ask ourselves which direction should we take, or
what can we do to protect marriage in the current situation. The paper con-
veys some reflections on this issue, as well as the prospective on the regulation
of marriage in the future.
I. MARRIAGE AT A CROSSROADS
The regulation of marriage is facing a crucial moment. We are
witnessing how the laws of marriage are fading away from the essence
of the marital union. Their future appears uncertain; we do not really
know what else is ahead or what the next juridical battle will be. We
can try and predict some developments in forthcoming years, but
none that will better protect marriage.
In most Western countries, courts and legislators have been de-
priving marriage of its essential elements for some time. As a conse-
quence of those interventions, stability has not been a characteristic
of the marital bond since non-fault divorce was generally accepted in
civil law. The nuance of the aim of marriage to rear and educate off-
spring is evident as well in those juridical systems where impotence is
not an impediment to marry. But despite these and other advance-
UJDC, Spain. This work has been funded by the Spanish Government - Economy Depart-
ment, in the framework of the Project DER 2012-34765, "La religi6n en el espacio psiblico:
conflictos y soluciones juridicas."
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ments and their undeniable impact on the regulation of marriage,
heterosexuality embodied a special significance. It was considered a
kind of red line that, once passed, would open the door to every im-
aginable variation of the marital union. That is the reason why Ober-
gefell v. Hodges is deemed a breakoff point on the regulation of mar-
riage, and why the regulation of marriage is at a critical junction.
Obergefell is not significant because of an overreaction to a ruling
that did not fulfil expectations. Rather, it is significant because it pos-
es a real challenge to marriage laws going forward. Chief Justice
Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, warned that if same-sex marriages
were allowed, so-called polyamorous relationships, or plural marriag-
es, would be entitled to ask for official recognition as well.' Plainly,
this ruling renders other forms of currently unacceptable marriage
relationships possible. Aiming to fulfil that prophecy, in the after-
math of Obergefell some comments criticized the ruling for being too
conservative: One paper says this:
[The Court] envisions marriage in an extraordinarily traditional and
conservative way. According to the Court, people wishing to be-
come their best selves and to live a life free from loneliness must
follow the most traditional of all paths: find a life-long companion
to the exclusion of all others and then get hitched. Any other way
that an individual might seek fulfilment and happiness is inferior. 2
Another paper praised the ruling as the beginning of real equality
for homosexuals, still with a long way ahead.'
What is the prospect of marriage in the current setting? I will
convey my opinions on this matter, leaving aside a neutral analysis of
marriage law that is well known and greatly publicized.
II. THE STATUS OF THE ISSUE
First, we cannot let dialogue on the meaning of marriage be re-
moved from the public arena. The idea that the debate on the defini-
tion of marriage has ended, at least regarding the latest amendments,
is widespread. Courts or legislators, depending on the country,
pledge that they have said the last word, adopting a broader defini-
1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
2. Leonore Carpenter & Davis S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the
Doctrine ofMarital Superiority, GEo. LJ. ONLINE 124, 126-27 (2015).
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tion of marriage that is regarded as a point of no return.
We can see this approach at different levels. In my own country
(Spain), the law allowing same-sex marriage was enacted when the
Socialist Party was in power.' The Popular Party appealed to the
Constitutional Court, arguing that the law contravened the Constitu-
tion.s For complicated political reasons, the Constitutional Court did
not issue a ruling until seven years later, when the Popular Party was
in power (2012).6 The ruling upheld the law; the Constitutional
Court said that the amendment of the Civil Code that introduced
same-sex marriage was consistent with the Constitution.' But the
Court stated that the other possible option, reserving marriage to
heterosexual unions and granting homosexual unions another regula-
tion, would also be consistent with the Constitution.' Therefore, the
Popular Party had no juridical obstacle to reinstate traditional mar-
riage in the Civil Code. However, this party did not want to engage
in that particular matter at that point in time, and they did not pro-
pose any amendment to the law of marriage. Even worse, they used a
reasoning that was not accurate from a juridical point of view to
maintain the current regulation of marriage.' The Secretary for Jus-
tice said that the government was bound by this judgment and would
not modify the law.1 o That is not the whole truth. Of course, the law
binds courts and civil servants, and they must apply it. However, poli-
ticians can propose an amendment to a law in force; hence, the Popu-
lar Party could have amended the Civil Code regulating marriage as a
heterosexual union, especially since they had a positive statement
from the Constitutional Court about this option and they had a ma-
jority in Parliament. Nonetheless, they did not modify it. They went
even further. A Vice Secretary of the Popular Party announced pub-
licly that he was going to marry his partner of nineteen years, and
that the President and other members of the government would be
4. Maria Linacero de la Fuente, Ley 13/2005, de I dejulio, por la que modifica el Codigo
civil en materia de derecho a contraer niatrimonio, FORo, NUEvA EPOCA, 02/2005, at 411-38
(2005).
5. Appeal of unconstitutionality No. 6864-2005, in relation to Law 13/2005, of 1 July,
amending the Civil Code concerning the right to marry, B.O.E. n. 273, Nov. 15, 2005 (Spain).
6. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 168) (Spain).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Gallarddn: "No modificard la ley y la dejard exactamente como estd", EL PAiS (Nov. 7,
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attending. He added, "I would like weddings like the one I am about
to have to no longer be in news."" But it was in the news, and the
current Secretary for Justice, also from the Popular Party, added that
the Constitutional Court appeased the controversy on same-sex mar-
riage, so "everything is solved."l2
Despite this context, we must avoid thinking that these recent de-
velopments are irreversible. The discussion about the meaning and
the proper regulation of marriage must continue and be re-launched.
As Chief Justice Roberts writes in his dissenting opinion in Obergefell,
"[c]losing debate tends to close minds."" Although the academic field
is a privileged one for keeping this discussion alive, we cannot retain
it inside universities. This implies making an effort to communicate
the legal reasoning in a way that works for everybody. Legal scholars,
as lawyers, must be proper and precise in the use of terms. However,
lawyers are a very small part of society, and we must be able to ex-
press what marriage is in an understandable and clear way. Language,
like other skills, can greatly contribute not to define truths, but to
clarify them.
The regulation of marriage has completely changed in a very
short time. As a consequence, it is necessary to adapt to this new con-
text. As little as twelve or fifteen years ago, talking about marriage
was not a great challenge. The terms of the discussions about mar-
riage used to be confronting different views regarding this institution
and its elements. Of course, different opinions arose and debates
were sometimes heated, but family scholars usually found themselves
explaining marriage in a context of the traditional understanding of
marriage. Now, the environment is more often than not harsh or
even hostile. Those who argue in favor of the traditional meaning of
marriage have moved, in slightly more than a decade, from being in
the majority to being in a minority. Furthermore, this minority is
deemed to hold unacceptable opinions. Only one view is allowed, and
often, those who do not accept it are labelled as bigots and therefore,
at times, are denied even the chance to engage in social dialogue or to
utter their arguments. Disagreement with this official truth, that is,
11. Maroto: "Quiero que una boda como la que voy a celebrar deje de ser noticia", ABC
ESPA&4A (Sep. 10, 2015), http://www.abc.es/espana/20150910/abci-boda-maroto-rajoy-2015
09101011.html.
12. Maroto: "Asi todo se arregld", ABC ESPAI~A (Sep. 10, 2015), http://www.abc.es/ espa-
na/ 2 0 150910/abci-boda-maroto-rajoy-201509101011 .html.
13. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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marriage includes everything allowed by the legislator, is not a choice
in some particular spheres.
III. CURRENT CHALLENGES
Adjusting to this new state of affairs is demanding. It requires
delving into some subjects that perhaps we took for granted, or ex-
pressing them in a different way. Thus, new challenges have been
added to those already inherent to the marriage debate. So, what di-
rection should the regulation of marriage take? I will now share my
opinions on the right and wrong ways to regulate marriage. I will
start with what I consider to be the wrong ways.
The first wrong way to regulate marriage would be to procure
the refuge of religion and abandon the field of its civil regulation.
The regulation and protection of marriage in compliance with its
constitutive elements is being taken back to the realm of the religious
denominations to the same extent as the withdrawal of the civil law to
protect it. Furthermore, some religious denominations are also push-
ing for a separation-or a definitive divorce-of civil and religious
marriages.14 These religious individuals and groups, perhaps dis-
mayed by the current situation and the prospective of marriage, press
for greater freedom to make judgments about sex, marriage, and fam-
ily life, based on their own religious beliefs." Marriage would be a
mere religious concept, whilst a new figure, called "civil union" or
any other way, would replace the "civil marriage," as this figure has
lost its main elements, and does not deserve this denomination any
14. See Laura Turner, What Happens When the 'Moral Majority' Becomes a Minority?,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/end-of-
moral-majority/407359/; Church Urges "Protection" of Marriage, THE CAYMAN REPORTER
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.caymanreporter.com/2015/09/28/church-urges-protection-
marriage/; NeilJ. Foster, Address at the Religious Freedom in a Multi-Cultural World Confe-
rence, Newcastle Law Sch.: How Should Religious Marriage Celebrants Respond if Same Sex
Marriage is Introduced in Australia? (Sep. 25, 2015) (transcript available at http://works. be-
press.con/neil-foster/96) (Author is an Associate Professor of Law at Newcastle Law School).
15. John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs The Family? Marriage as a New Text
Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 5 FAULKNER L. REV. 321 (2013). See also Martin D. Stem,
Time to Divorce Civil and Religious Marriage, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (May 24, 2013), http://
www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/letters/time-to-divorce-civil-and-religious-marriage-
29292930.html) (Stern, an Orthodox Jew, states: "As far as I can see, the only way out of the
current dispute [on the definition of marriage] is for the state to legislate for 'civil partnerships'
only and eschew the word 'marriage', while recognizing marriages within religious communities
as qualifying as such. What the state chooses to call 'marriage' should be irrelevant to religious
communities, so long as it does not force its definition on them. Perhaps the time has come for




more.' 6 This is an understandable approach for the religious denomi-
nations, which are witnessing a progressive erosion of marriage in so-
ciety, and are trying to protect it inside their own walls. But this is
not completely desirable. The outcome of this trend would be a di-
chotomy that would "prevent [us] from speaking simply of marriage,"
as a universal institution," and as a consequence, the protection of
traditional marriage would be transferred to the field of religious
freedom.
Indeed, marriage has a religious element that should not be un-
derestimated. As we have recently seen, with the Kentucky clerk af-
fair, if regulation of marriage does not count on the religious ele-
ment, freedom of religion may be neglected." Looking for
accommodation of religion in the civil sphere is fair, and even una-
voidable. An example of this intent is the Texas Pastor Protection
Act, enacted some months ago. 9 Texas Attorney General Ken Pax-
ton said, "[n]o pastor, priest, rabbi or other religious leader should be
forced to perform or recognize a marriage that contradicts his or her
sincere religious belief."2 0 Examples like that may become more fre-
quent in the future, amid the statements in Obergefell. But marriage is
not an exclusively religious institution; it is a secular relationship both
for believers and non-believers. Marriage must be protected by itself
as a foundation of society, not just as a manifestation of religious
freedom. Focusing only on the religious component will lead to re-
linquishing the concept of marriage as a universal institution. Even
the suspicion that marriage is only a part of certain religious con-
servative beliefs or ideologies should be avoided. Religion (including
all religious faiths that depict a traditional marriage) should be an
16. Linda C. McClain, Maniage Pluralism in the United States, in MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 309, 313 (Joel A. Nichols, ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012).
17. Katherine S. Spaht, Covenant Marriage Laws: A Modelfor Compromise, in MARRIAGE
AN) DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 120, 132 (Joel A. Nichols, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012).
18. See Travis Loller, Kentucky Clerk Case Divides Religious Liberty Advocates, ASSOC.
PRESS (Sept. 13, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7e2c85ddl32947a2a fa7e b1c54515fad/
kentucky-clerk-case-divides-religious-liberty-advocates. See also comments by Lynn Wardle,
With Kim Davis, Federal Court Botched Opportunity to Show it Can Protect Religious Liberty,
CNSNEws (Sept. 8, 2015), http://cnsnews.com/commentary/ynn-wardle/ judicial-coercion-
and-respect-religious-liberty.
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (West 2015).
20. See Liz Crampton, Abbott Signs "Pastor Protection Act" into Law, TEXAS TRIBUNE
(June 11, 2015), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/06/11/gov-abbott-signs-pastor-protection-
Act/
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aide, not a shelter, to the task of protecting marriage.
Another less than desirable approach to regulating marriage
would be attempting to separate "black label marriage", the one with
all the constitutive elements of this union, from "legal marriage," that
will convey all unions accepted by law. This is a secular variation of
the previous position. Although it seems reasonable, it may be diffi-
cult to accept because it will be deemed as elitist and discriminatory.
All regulations that try to differentiate between heterosexual unions
and homosexual unions will likely be rejected. After all, they bring
about the controversy of accepting same-sex unions yet denying
same-sex marriage.
Finally, I think it would be a disservice to the debate to adopt a
merely resistant attitude, refusing to comply with the law but without
actively trying to get the proper legal recognition of marriage. In
other words, relinquishing the protection of marriage not in a certain
field, but in all: giving up in protecting marriage. It is not enough to
say that the regulation of marriage is wrong altogether, and to take
the path of objection of conscience or civil disobedience. This nega-
tive approach, that at times is needed and even acquires great rele-
vance, should be the consequence of a positive option in favor of
freedom, but not the central statement in any position. Besides, it
bears the risk of being ignored, as nothing but controversy is offered.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEBATE ON MARRIAGE
What would be the correct framework to place this new debate
on marriage in?
First, we must emphasize the idea that marriage is an institution
that stems from human nature. A majority or a minority cannot de-
cide its definition and characteristics. This is the central issue, and
the main reason not to give up on the protection of marriage. From
this perspective, I find Chief Justice Robert's dissent in Obergefell not
fully accurate, because his defense of marriage does not rely on the
nature of marriage. -is words are clear:
Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether,
in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to
include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our demo-
cratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting
through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who hap-
pen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes
according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt about the an-
223
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swer.21
To be fair, Chief Justice Roberts explains a little later that
This universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a
woman is no historical coincidence. Marriage did not come about as
a result of a political movement, discovery, disease, war, religious
doctrine, or any other moving force of world history-and certainly
not as a result of a prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbians.
It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that
children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising
them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship. 22
A hypothetical ruling rejecting same-sex marriage only because it
is not within the powers of the Court to decide would have been only
a temporary achievement. Judges, even the Supreme Court, cannot
change the definition of marriage as the dissenting opinions rightly
sustain. But legislators cannot redefine the marital union either. Mar-
riage does not depend on a majority opinion that can change; it is
immutable; "the core meaning of marriage has endured." 23 The ma-
jority can decide that same-sex unions, or other kind of unions,
should be regulated by the State. This may be considered a good or
bad policy, but it does not pose any problem from the juridical point
of view. Changing marriage to include other juridical figures that do
not bear its constitutive elements, such as polygamy, non-committed
bonds or same-sex unions, is not good juridical practice, even though
a majority supports the regulation of those unions. Even if only very
few countries in the world keep a traditional conception of marriage,
marriage would still be marriage.
Under this approach, data should be properly used in the debate
on marriage. Numbers can help demonstrate that a government poli-
21. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Roberts insists
on this idea:
It can be tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the require-
ments of the law. But as this Court has been reminded throughout our history, the
Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing views." Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accordingly, "courts are not
concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation." Id., at 69 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). The majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role. It
seizes for itself a question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the
people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that question. And it answers that question
based not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own "understanding
of what freedom is and must become." Ante, at 19. 1 have no choice but to dissent.
22. Id. at 2613.
23. Id. at 2615.
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cy is, or is not, suitable, or if a particular issue deserves attention due
to its social support. However, a well-aimed defense of marriage
should raise other arguments: it is not the numbers, but the nature of
marriage, that merits government protection. If marriage were not an
institution based on human nature, those who wanted to fight to de-
fend it should give up and move to the political field to do so. A ju-
ridical opinion, even based on reliable data, does not deserve such a
strong defense as the protection of an institution that goes beyond
the law, or better, that is logically prior to the law.
Secondly, as marriage is a pre-juridical institution, there should
be a reason why the State regulates it. What is that reason? It is none
other than the benefits that marriage provides for society. Otherwise,
the State regulation of marriage would not make sense; marriage
would exist either with or without the intervention of the State; cou-
ples have established marital unions well before any written law ap-
peared. But marriage is not only a personal relationship, or an
agreement to live together and share expenses. It bestows an essential
benefit to society: the community created by the marital bond is the
best environment to rear children.2 4 Family based on marriage is con-
sidered the cell of society because it has the best ambience for raising
and educating the new generation. The offspring of a marriage grow
up in an environment of mutual respect and cooperation of both pro-
genitors. If marriage did not provide this benefit, the State would not
be any more interested in marriage than it is in friendship or in sexual
relationships out of marriage, and the State has never-as far as I
know-enacted laws on friendship or other personal relationships.
This assessment may raise an objection. If marriage deserves the
24. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (quoting J.Q. WILSON, TiHE, MARRIAGE
PROBLEM, 41 (2002)):
The human race must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexual
relations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations result in the concep-
tion of a child, that child's prospects are generally better if the mother and father
stay together rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good of chil-
dren and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only be-
tween a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.
Society has recognized that bond as marriage. And by bestowing a respected sta-
tus and material benefits on married couples, society encourages men and women to
conduct sexual relations within marriage rather than without. As one prominent
scholar put it, "Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the problem of getting
people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for children, and
the sex that makes children possible, does not solve."
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attention of the State because of the interest of children, what about
sterile couples? Would sterile couples, then, also be excluded from
marriage for the same reasons same-sex couples would be? The an-
swer to this question is that marriage is protected by the State be-
cause of the aims it pursues, not because any or every single couple
achieves them. The aim of marriage is to ensure the well being of the
spouses and the creation and education of children, and those goals
benefit society. Therefore, all who enter into this relationship should
aim to reach these goals, although not all couples will do so. Howev-
er, the failure of some couples to reach the goals does not affect the
essence of the institution. The same happens in any other institution;
a company or an enterprise that does not obtain benefits is still a
company or enterprise albeit an unsuccessful one, but the company
does not become a non-profit corporation because of its lack of prof-
it.
Besides this, let us not forget that laws not only regulate social
life, they inform, teach, and shape public values. People without ju-
ridical knowledge tend to identify what is legal and what is right.
There are many who assume that if an act or institution is allowed by
law, it is "right" from every other perspective. We saw how many
people switched their position endorsing express divorce, same-sex
marriage, and maybe other unions soon after the enactment of those
laws.25
If marriage is regulated and protected because of its benefits, a
logical conclusion is that if the new idea of marriage depicted by the
law does not necessarily provide for those benefits, the grounds for its
regulation and protection may not be the same as those of traditional
marriage. The developments of these past decades-non-fault di-
vorce, same-sex marriage and others-have completely changed the
shape and aims of the marital relationship. It still has to be demon-
strated that all unions that now fall under the umbrella of civil mar-
riage purport a benefit to society, because their aim is not to create
and educate the new generation.26 Sure, some individual unions can
25. See David Blackenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TimEs (June
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-
changed, html? _r=0; Stella Morabito, Bait and Switch: How Same Sex Marriage Ends Family Au-
tonomy, Ti iE FEDERALIST (Apr. 9, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/04/09/bait-and-switch-
how-same-sex-marriage-ends-marriage-and-family-autonomy/; Paul Elias, Schwarzenegger: Let
Same-sex Weddings Resume Now, LAS VEGAS REv.J. (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.reviewjoumal.
com/news/schwarzenegger-let-same-sex-weddings-resume-now.
26. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 48.
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contribute to this goal, but it is not an unavoidable target of marriage
any more. Then, if the marital unions are only self-fulfilling unions,
without an outcome that may be of general interest, even if they are
satisfactory for individual persons, why should public powers regulate
them? There is not an apparent reason for the State to regulate these
unions. Marriage appears as a relationship based on affection that
demands economic benefits for no other special reason than two per-
sons living together; something that good friends living together
without having sex could demand as well, following the same ra-
tionale. Besides, it is difficult to label a bond that does not have a real
expectation of being permanent as the foundation of society. While
the bond of true marriage is a bond, where both parties commit them-
selves permanently to certain rights and duties, it is not the same in
most regulations of marriage currently in force, where one can opt-
out from that relationship so easily. Rather, it is a relationship that
exists today and tomorrow may disappear without much more trouble
than returning an unwanted item bought in a store.
Then, when Obergefell, like some scholars, continues to insist that
marriage is the keystone of social order, we should wonder what it is
talking about. Traditional marriage, real marriage, or true marriage,
was the keystone of society for many centuries, and history has shown
the importance of this institution, as well as the failure of other struc-
tures that tried to replace marriage as the foundation of society, as it
happened in some totalitarian regimes. We still have to see if this
new legal marriage, where personal choice and satisfying individual's
desires are its main aims, may be the foundation of society as well.
We must put the debate on marriage in the right context: when
we talk about acceptance of same-sex marriage, or polyamory, or the
like, we are not talking about human rights. We are talking about try-
ing to modify an institution that has neither been invented nor de-
signed by legislators. Homosexuals and heterosexuals all have the
same fundamental rights. Homosexuals already had the right to en-
ter into marriage before the recognition of same-sex marriage; they
were not denied a right, in the sense that neither any law nor stat-
ute-as far as I know-denied homosexuals the right to marry. Only,
the marital relationship requires two persons of different sex because
of its aims; therefore, two individuals of the same sex could not enter
into it. Likewise, heterosexuals can now enter into same-sex marriag-
es; they are not restricted to homosexual couples. Thus, the only
thing that changed is that marriage does not need two people of dif-
227
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ferent sex in the civil law; the regulation of the institution changed,
rights are the same before and after the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage.
Making same-sex marriage a case of fundamental rights brings
this debate to a field where dissent is not possible. Fundamental
rights enjoy a special protection, and everybody is supposed to en-
dorse them. If same-sex marriage is considered a fundamental right,
those who do not support it are outlaws, not lawyers or scholars that
back up a certain juridical interpretation of the law. And, as a conse-
quence, they are not admitted into public debate.
A further step with regards to the rights related to marriage is
that they are moving from a right to privacy to a right to recognition.
Roberts says in the Obergefill dissent:
[T]he privacy cases provide no support for the majority's position,
because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, they
seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corre-
sponding government benefits. Our cases have consistently refused
to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by constitutional
liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the
State.... Thus, although the right to privacy recognized by our
precedents certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct
of same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to redefine
marriage and no basis for striking down the laws at issue here. 27
If, during the last century, people demanded to do whatever they
wanted inside the relationship of marriage, the current century seems
to be presided by the claim that the State must recognize which peo-
ple want to be married, banning those who want to monopolize this
relationship-in the sense that marriage would be only a heterosexu-
al, permanent and committed relationship-, keeping it into certain
boundaries, or not allowing any possible union to get into the fold of
marriage. The pledge of keeping the State out of bedrooms seems to
have been transformed into a petition of regulating what is going on
in everybody's bedrooms. In the United States, this change may be
perceived in case law. We can compare the Griswold trilogy Griswold
v. Connecticut,28 Turner v. Safley,29 and Zablocki v. Redhail," which ap-
pealed to the right to marital privacy, to the Romer trilogy-Romer v.
27. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 57 (dissenting).
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
30. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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Evans," Lawrence v. Texas,32 and Windsor v. United States"-which
demanded that public powers impose a certain idea of the marital un-
ion.
V. CONCLUSION
We must keep in mind that there is a particular item in the back-
ground of the debates on marriage. The two different positions on
this issue appear to be irreconcilable: on one side, the idea of mar-
riage as a permanent union, exclusive and comprehensive, based on
the nature of man, and aimed at rearing offspring. On the other side,
the conception of marriage as an agreement between two parties
based on an emotional compromise, that lawmakers must regulate ac-
cording to social demands--or pressures-of time and place. These
two different positions are not only juridical but ideological ones.
Therefore, no meeting point seems to be possible unless one of the
sides relinquishes its principles. Undoubtedly, this is a more uncom-
fortable situation than another one where compromise is possible;
here, one or the other will prevail. However, an ideological convic-
tion gives meaning to the effort of protecting marriage. A merely ju-
ridical opinion does not deserve the endeavor.
History shows, over and over again, that marriage survives the
toughest challenges. The truth about marriage-or better, the truth
about men and women-will eventually prevail, although, maybe, we
will not live to see it. In this case, the challenging task of family
scholars is keeping this truth safe for the next generation.
31. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. - (2013).
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